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Our objective is to assess personal income under perfect competition, when
factors are rewarded according to their productivities, and to contrast the ensuing
distribution with the status quo. Competition will yield winners and losers, both in
terms of factor claims and in terms of regions or provinces. Income differences
will press people to migrate. To analyze this, we divide China into 30 input-output
sectors and 27 provinces; we maximize domestic final demand, while preserving
its proportions in each province, subject to material balances and factor
constraints. The shadow prices to the constraints represent competitive
commodity prices and factor rewards.  Unskilled labor would stand to lose and,
therefore, inequality would mount. The pressure on interprovincial migration
would be enormous with 10 to 20% of the people on the road. The flipside is the
great potential for improvement of the average standard of living.
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1. Introduction
There is an unfortunate division of labor in the field of income distribution. Economists
focus on the functional distribution of income, employing the concept of factor
productivity. Statisticians focus on the personal distribution of income, particularly the
measurement of income and inequality. Now we are interested in the question what
competition would do to the distribution of income in China. This requires an
integration of functional and personal income analyses, which seems novel.
Our objective is to assess personal income under perfectly competitive competition,
where factors are rewarded according to their productivities, and to contrast the ensuing
distribution with the status quo. For this we need two things. First, a general equilibrium
model to determine the shadow prices of factor inputs (ten Raa and Mohnen, 2001).
Second, detailed statistical information to assign factor inputs, such as different types of
labor, to persons and families. In other words, we need the composition of personal
income by source of income. Competition will reset the prices of the different types of
labor and capital and, using the personal factor titles, a new personal income
distribution will emerge.
Competition will yield winners and losers, both in terms of factor claims and in terms of
regions or provinces. Income differences will press people to migrate. This mechanism
will take some steam off the income inequality problem that comes with free markets in3
China. We investigate it by running two scenarios. In the first specification of our
general equilibrium model, mobility is limited to unskilled labor.  In other words, we
assume that people rather climb down the skill ladder than migrate and move only if
they are pushed down to unskilled labor and face unemployment (with zero income
under competition). In the second specification we extend free mobility to all levels of
labor. Migration will mitigate provincial shortages and level out shadow prices for
labor. The consequent inequality is expected to be less severe.
In this paper we focus on competitive income formation in China and summarize the
entailing income levels and inequality. Detailed comparison of the competitive income
inequality to the actual one, by urban-rural division, province, and social class, is left to
the sequel paper (ten Raa and Pan, this issue).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the input-
output model used to optimize the Chinese economy. Section 3 determines the
supporting factor rewards and the consequent income statistics. Section 4 reveals the
migration of labor across China's provinces. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. The input-output model
We divide China into 30 input-output sectors and 27 provinces
1. Figure 1 is a handy
map
2. Each province generates domestic final demand plus net exports, which are both
30-dimensional vectors. The provincial net exports vectors sum to the national net
exports, because inter-provincial deliveries cancel out. National net exports remain
fixed in our analysis, so any efficiency gain is brought about by the reallocation of
production between provinces. We assume Leontief preferences; denote the domestic
final demand proportions of province i  by vector 
i f  (which we obtain by scaling the
domestic final demand vector down to unity). The assumptions of the first and second4
welfare theorems will be fulfilled, so we may determine the competitive allocation by
maximizing the standard of living. The conflict of interest between provinces is handled
in Negishi (1960) style, as follows.
Figure 1. Location of Chinese provinces
We let each province generate a domestic final demand vector with the same
proportions, namely
i
i fdD , where scalar D represents the national domestic final use
and  i d  a provincial share. If we substitute observed values for D and  i d , we obviously
obtain a feasible point. Given any list of  i d 's (using the observed provincial shares as
initial values), we maximize D. In short, we maximize domestic final demand, while
preserving its proportions in each province, and given the provincial shares. The linear
program described in Appendix 1 maximizes D subject to material balances and factor
constraints. The shadow prices to the constraints represent competitive commodity5
prices and factor rewards, respectively.  The material balances, capital constraints, and
unskilled labor constraints are at the national level, presuming free trade and mobility of
capital and workers, at least of those who are threatened to loose income.  The other
labor constraints are either province specific or also pooled across China, depending on
the scenario.
The linear program determines a gross output vector for each province. Subtraction of
intermediate demand (as determined by the input-output matrix) and domestic final
demand (
i
i fdD ) yields the competitive net exports vector. Valuation by the
competitive commodity prices yields the balance of payments of province i. If it
exceeds the observed balance of payments, then the province under consideration
exports too much and we give its domestic final demand share more weight by
increasing the value of  i d , at the expense of the other provinces. For the new list of
shares, we recalculate the maximum overall domestic final use, etcetera. In the limit we
obtain an optimal domestic final use that observes not only the consumption patterns in
the provinces, but also their balances of payments. Basically, we thus find the optimum
pattern of specialization between provinces, along with the supporting shadow prices of
commodities and factor inputs. The execution of this program demands an enormous
input-output database, comprising input statistics by sector and province for
commodities, capital, and labor, stock statistics by province for capital and labor, and
the latter broken down by skill. Appendix 2 outlines the data collection procedure. The
data are made available by the authors upon request.
3. Competitive rewards
The factor inputs are capital plus four types of labor: technicians, managers, skilled, and
unskilled workers. This order is assumed to constitute a top down hierarchy. In other6
words, technicians are capable of fulfilling any of the labor tasks, managers can do their
own job, skilled, or unskilled work, skilled workers can do their own job or perform
unskilled work, and unskilled workers do their own job or are unemployed. We run two
scenarios, which differ by the treatment of labor mobility.
In the first scenario we assume that workers prefer to stay put, climbing down the skill
ladder rather than migrating, until they face unemployment. Formally, if 
i l1 is the row
vector of technicians coefficients in province i , 
i l2 the same, but of managers, 
i l3 of
skilled labor, and  4
i l  of unskilled labor, then the vector of outputs by sector in province
i , 
i x , is feasible with respect to the labor forces 
i N1 , 
i N2 , 
i N3, and 
i N4 , if
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The first inequality constrains demand for technicians. The second constraint can be
rewritten as
22 1 1 ()
ii i i ii lx N N lx ≤+ −
indicating that managerial demand is constrained by the sum of the labor force of
managers and the number of redundant technicians. Similarly, the third constraint binds
demand for skilled labor by the sum of the force of skilled workers and the numbers of
technicians or managers for whom there are no jobs at the top 2 levels. The fourth and7
last constraint is pooled over provinces. Only the sum of the total number of unskilled
workers and the total number of higher skilled workers for whom there are no jobs at
the top 3 levels in their own provinces, binds demand for unskilled labor.
The four constraints pick up shadow prices as the model determines the optimum
allocation. The shadow price of the fourth constraint is the base wage. The shadow price
of the third constraint is the skill premium. The shadow price of the second constraint is
the managerial premium. The shadow price of the first constraint is the technician's
premium. Technicians pick up shadow values from all four constraints and, therefore,
the competitive wage of a technician will be the sum of the base wage and all three
premiums. If, for example, the first constraint is not binding, meaning that there is
excess supply of technicians, then the wage of a technician will be the base wage, plus
the skill and managerial premiums, while the technician's premium is zero. In other
words, the hierarchy of labor tasks' fulfillment guarantees that wages will increase by
skill (or at least not decrease).
In the second scenario we allow for full labor mobility, summing not only the unskilled
labor constraints over provinces, but also the skilled, managerial and technical labor
constraints. Here the implicit assumption is that workers rather move to another
province than accept a lower skilled job. By implication, not only the base wage, but
also all premiums will be uniform across China. In other words, free mobility eliminates
wage differentials between provinces.
We now present the results, in Table 1.8
Table 1.  Competitive factor rewards for the provinces (under limited mobility)
and China (under full mobility)
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Beijing BJ 0 0 0 149085 0.11 2.26
Tianjin TJ 0 0 86845 86845 0 1.47
Hebei HB 0 3369 58792 58792 0.21 0.7
Liaoning LN 0 0 0 95973 0.08 1.35
Shanghai SH 0 0 125248 125248 0.43 2
Jiangsu JS 0 0 36853 98241 0 1.1
Zhejiang ZJ 0 3052 3052 92814 0.1 1.19
Fujian FJ 0 6692 50130 50130 0.26 1.27
Shandong SD 0 5911 57285 57285 0.12 1.08
Guangdong GD 0 0 14534 152132 0.26 2.45
Middle
Shanxi SX 0 5402 5402 41729 0.13 0.51
Neimeng NM
Jilin JL 0 4931 4931 39531 0.25 1.36
Heilongjiang HLJ 0 0 52470 53867 0 1.43
Anhui AH 0 4619 35839 35839 0.11 0.77
Jiangxi JX 0 4807 4807 40256 0.15 0.88
Henan HeN 0 4225 36607 36607 0.23 0.75
Hubei HuB 0 846 846 40494 0.28 0.91
Hunan HuN 0 5292 53682 53682 0.12 0.79
Western
Guangxi GX 0 5605 45914 45914 0.23 0.85
Hainan HN
Shichuan SC 0 1226 1226 57502 0.21 0.58
Guizhou GZ 0 8641 8641 34858 0.21 0.76
Yunnan YN 0 6835 6835 20684 0.08 0
Tibet TB
Shaanxi ShX 0 1779 1779 52916 0.14 0.61
Gansu GS 0 5128 46837 46837 0.09 0.5
Qinghai QH 0 4036 47978 47978 0.07 0.69
Ningxia NX 0 2040 62649 62649 0.01 0.54
Xinjiang XJ 0 9007 66330 66330 0 3.32
China 608 793 38278 382789
Competition would have some dramatic effects. First and foremost, as the first column
of Table 1 reveals for the provinces (under limited labor mobility), the competitive base
wage is zero. The shortage of skilled labor in China would be a bottleneck if the
economy were freely restructured along competitive lines. If, however, labor mobility
were extended to all workers, then the bottleneck disappears and unskilled labor
becomes short, picking up a substantial base wage. The pooling of all labor markets
across provinces enlarges the feasible set quite a bit, which boosts total income further.
Comparing the three income figures in Table 2 we conclude that Chinese domestic
income is nearly 88% of its potential level, assuming limited mobility, or slightly over
60%, assuming full mobility.
While income grows steadily as markets are liberalized, the behavior of inequality is
hill-shaped. Free markets would create serious inequality problems, but the problem is
reduced in the transition from the first to the second scenario (when all labor markets
become fluid across provinces), primarily because unskilled workers earnings rebound
to positive values.
           Table 2.  China's income and Theil index
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Income (billion Yuan) Theil index
Observed 244 0.066
Limited mobility 316 0.617
Full mobility 395 0.392
Table 1 reflects the so-called dual variables of the program that maximizes the standard
of living in China. The underlying primal variables, the sectoral output levels by
province, specify the allocation itself and reveal the optimum pattern of specialization
within China. The most extreme results are obtained in the second scenario where all10
labor can freely flow between provinces. Table 3 provides the pattern. Agriculture
remains active in a great number of provinces, but most other activities are best
undertaken in specific provinces. Table 3 thus locates the comparative advantages of the
Chinese provincial economies, revealing the threats and challenges they face. Most
provinces best combine agriculture with some other industry or service. Only a few
provinces have the potential to sustain a diversified economy under a perfectly
competitive regime.
4. Labor migration
The competitive input-output model reallocates economic activity as to maximize the
standard of living in China and this affects the level and mix of labor demand by
province. The new demand for labor requires immigration, for unskilled labor in the
first scenario, and for all types of labor in the second scenario. We depict all labor
motions in Tables 4 and 5. Positive figures denote outflows and negative figures
inflows. In Table 4 labor mobility is assumed to be limited to unskilled labor; changes
in the use of other labor must be intra-provincial and, by our hierarchy assumption,
reflect movements down the skill ladder. The first column shows the numbers of
technicians kicked down to lesser skilled labor. All of them, however, can do the next
best job, managerial labor, as the matching negative figures in the second column
reveal. The positive figures in the second column represent managers who must do
lesser work. In most cases they can perform skilled labor tasks, but in two provinces
they are bumped further down the ladder. In Liaoning, the managers must accept
unskilled work and in Beijing they must even go to another province or join the pool of
the unemployed.11
Table 3.  Sectoral activity in provinces
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Sectors Active provinces
Agriculture 1 BJ, TJ, HB, LN, JL, HLJ, SH, ZJ, FJ, JX, SD,
HuB, HuN, GX, SC, YN, ShX, QH, NX
Coal mining & processing 2 SX
Petroleum & gas extraction 3 ShX
Metal mining & processing 4 SH
Non-metals mining & processing 5 HB
Food manufacturing 6 SH
Textile industry 7 FJ
Sewing & leather products 8 SH
Timer & furniture manufacturing 9 SH, AH
Paper making & stationary goods 10 AH
Electrical power steaming 11 JS
Petroleum processing 12 JX
Coking gas & coal products 13 GZ
Chemical industry 14 AH
Non-metals products 15 HB
Smelting & processing of metals 16 SX, ZJ
Metal products 17 HB
Machinery & equipment manufacturing 18 SD
Transportation equipment manufacturing 19 SD
Electric equipment & machinery 20 SD
Electronics & telecommunications equipments 21 AH, FJ
Instrument & meters 22 HuN
Other manufacturing 23 AH
Construction 24 HuN
Transportation & telecommunications 25 SH
Commerce 26 GX, XJ
Social service 27 HB, AH, HeN, GZ, GS
Culture, education & research 28 TJ, JS, GD
Banking & insurance 29 TJ
Public administration 30 All12
Table 4.  Limited Labor Mobility in Competitive Markets (outflows of workers)
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Province Technicians Managers Skilled Unskilled Total Unemployed Migrants
Eastern
BJ 0 44953 1279827 1378179 2702959 410002 2292956
TJ 9762 -9762 2002887 1642350 3645237 552933 3092303
HB 29223 -29223 0 -5830336 -5830336 0 -5830336
LN 0 347449 6964822 -16461870 -9149599 0 -9149599
SH 58931 -58931 143024 1038694 1181717 179251 1002467
JS 0 0 1454180 -5890230 -4436050 0 -4436050
ZJ 0 71015 -71015 -4986863 -4986863 0 -4986863
FJ 25413 -25413 0 -3896258 -3896258 0 -3896258
SD 31689 -31689 0 -2364354 -2364354 0 -2364354
GD 0 0 5373631 -10711608 -5337977 0 -5337977
Middle
SX 0 42125 -42125 165904 165904 25165 140738
JL 0 37409 -37409 -3226722 -3226722 0 -3226722
HLJ 0 0 1354236 9082944 10437180 1583180 8854001
AH 104041 -104041 0 21928134 21928134 3326202 18601931
JX 0 36277 -36277 -2684545 -2684545 0 -2684545
HeN 76754 -76754 0 38110850 38110850 5780902 32329947
HuB 0 49173 -49173 -1505285 -1505285 0 -1505285
HuN 26545 -26545 0 -6451469 -6451469 0 -6451469
Western
GX 47514 -47514 0 -2462967 -2462967 0 -2462967
SC 0 15302 -15302 -11973333 -11973333 0 -11973333
GZ 0 13257 -13257 -31970 -31970 0 -31970
YN 0 29884 -29884 -2068777 -2068777 0 -2068777
ShX 0 10365 -10365 -1768127 -1768127 0 -1768127
GS 19152 -19152 0 -3124099 -3124099 0 -3124099
QH 6030 -6030 0 -508408 -508408 0 -508408
NX 3088 -3088 0 1711862 1711862 259666 1452195
XJ 34982 -34982 0 4763098 4763098 722498 4040601
China 473124 224084 18267799 -6125207 12839800 12839800 7180714013
Table 5.  Full Labor Mobility in Competitive Markets (outflows of workers)
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Province Technicians Managers Skilled Unskilled Total Unemployed Migrants
Eastern
BJ 523316 -5541 1897325 -13405414 -10990313 0 -10990313
TJ -2269299 -307334 1475014 666963 -434655 0 -434655
HB 391478 -333404 -4771198 16662626 11949502 0 11949502
LN 1462380 419809 6961669 -30395275 -21551417 0 -21551417
SH -225255 -358654 -6958517 -2893130 -10435556 0 -10435556
JS -3494421 17785 9994515 24727402 31245282 0 31245282
ZJ 849965 203448 3523130 -8926386 -4349843 0 -4349843
FJ 353451 -20805 -3497769 -2733534 -5898657 0 -5898657
SD 375766 -276158 -4631497 -22702952 -27234842 0 -27234842
GD -4669089 -296916 8128426 20498257 23660678 0 23660678
Middle
SX 284483 -80875 -3445017 9372636 6131227 0 6131227
JL 869289 197192 3245101 -9002456 -4690873 0 -4690873
HLJ 1077018 244081 4451721 -15966690 -10193870 0 -10193870
AH -616148 -787779 -12990131 24618594 10224536 0 10224536
JX 781876 167559 2354644 -4001256 -697177 0 -697177
HeN 1341568 201972 3759760 37878917 43182217 0 43182217
HuB 1440151 292988 5096161 -17058434 -10229135 0 -10229135
HuN -872369 -456036 -9909843 180852 -11057397 0 -11057397
Western
GX -340478 -753080 -12414881 4860314 -8648124 0 -8648124
SC 2205511 417382 7325684 -30582896 -20634319 0 -20634319
GZ 194290 -84439 -401935 13116773 12824689 0 12824689
YN 732736 139446 1977140 1362004 4211325 0 4211325
ShX 818941 183706 2134703 -6599557 -3462208 0 -3462208
GS 420123 81387 1086233 9754004 11341747 0 11341747
QH 139152 30596 426655 -1375541 -779138 0 -779138
NX 119322 20381 360031 -1853792 -1354057 0 -1354057
XJ -311825 -438645 -5177126 3797972 -2129623 0 -2129623
China 1581934 -1581934 0 0 0 0 014
If we add all the mutations in the labor classes we get a positive or negative figure,
depending on the province, and this translates in emigration or immigration,
respectively. Since the net balance of labor demand mutations is positive, some workers
are no longer needed and feed the pool of the unemployed. This figure is a modest 12.8
million. The composition of the labor force by skill is fairly stable. Few technicians and
managers are bumped down, but many skilled workers must switch to unskilled labor.
In the second scenario all provincial labor demand mutations can be perceived as taking
place through national markets, so in Table 5 the figures can be interpreted directly as
inter-provincial movements. It is interesting to notice that the table is balanced, meaning
that all workers find a job elsewhere. In particular, the demand for unskilled labor
covers the unskilled labor force, in line with the positive wage we found for this
scenario in section 3. The market of skilled labor is also balanced. Unlike the previous
scenario, full labor mobility implies a shortage of managerial workers, albeit modest.
Technicians, in line with Table 3 where they were shown to earn the same wage as
managers, fill the gap.
So far we have limited our investigation of the efficient reallocation to labor. A final
step is to include the dependants, to obtain people migration figures. The sequel paper
provides so called dependency ratios. Applying these to the labor motions of Tables 4
and 5 we obtain the net emigration figures by province for the limited and the full labor
mobility scenarios shown in Table 6. In either case the positive figures (denoting
emigration) sum to the same total as the negative figures (denoting immigration). In the
limited mobility scenario this figure is 125 million persons, while in the full mobility
scenario it would shoot up to 269 million persons, suggesting that free markets would
exercise an enormous pressure to move.15
Table 6.  Population Migration in Competitive Markets










































Net migration 28547870 14873113
      China
Emigration 124912734 268101527
Immigration -125642108 -125642108
Overall errors -729374 -2564354
Where would people go? It is handy to distinguish eastern from middle and western
China. Referring to Table 1 for provincial codes and to Figure 1 for a map, Eastern
China consists of Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Jiangsu,
Fujian, Hebei, Shandong, Middle China of Heilongjian, Jilin, Shanxi, Neimeng, Jiangxi,
Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, Henan, and Western China of Hainan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai,
Ningxia, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu, and Guizhou. We will now
discuss the pattern of migration in either scenario.
When labor mobility is limited (scenario 1) redundant technicians substitute for
managers in the thirteen provinces of Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Anhui, Fujian,
Shandong, Henan, Hunan, Guangxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. In the
provinces of Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hubei, Shichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, and Shaanxi, redundant managers substitute for skilled labor. In the17
provinces of Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangshu, and
Guangdong, some skilled labor is redundant, and substitute for unskilled labor. In total,
the provinces of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Anhui, Henan,
Ningxia, and Xinjiang have emigration, while other provinces face immigration. The
difference between redundancy and migration reflects the unemployment.
When labor mobility is full (scenario 2), Table 5 shows the situation of labor
substitution and migration in all provinces. In the nineteen provinces of Beijing,  Hebei,
Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan,
Hubei, Shichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia, redundant
technicians substitute for managers or migrate out. In the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin,
Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Shichuan, Yunnan, Shaanxi,
Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia, redundant managers substitute for skilled labor or migrate
out. In the provinces of Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangshu,
Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Shichuan, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu,
Qinghai, and Ningxia, some skilled labor is redundant, and substitute for unskilled labor
or migrate out. In total, the provinces of Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang,
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Shichuan,
Shaanxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang have immigration, while other provinces face
emigration.
For many decades, the Chinese government has conducted a special system of residence
registration, the so-called "Hukou". The economic reform has weakened the action of
the "Hukou", giving more freedom to the labor markets. Labor moves under the
incentive to survive or to improve the standard of living. Currently, the mobility of
labor, particularly farmers, is steadily increasing. In current years there have been tens
of millions of farmers moving around the country to search a work. Wang et al (1995)18
estimate that, at that time, China have in fact 130 million surplus farmers, and that this
number will increase to 230 million in the next ten years.
In scenario 1, over 70 million unskilled laborers will migrate, as the figure on national
migration shows in Table 4. In scenario 2, over 15 million laborers will migrate, as the
national redundancy figure shows in Table 5. Table 6 shows that national-wide migrants
that is including with the family members,
8 will be about 125 and 270 million in two
scenarios, respectively. Under scenario 1, in the eastern part, Beijing, Tianjin and
Shanghai, the three most developed provinces in China, will absorb 11 million migrants,
while the other seven provinces will export 62 million migrants. Overall, the eastern
will export 51 million migrants. In the middle part, Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Anhui, and
Henan will attract nearly 105 million, among which 24 million come from the other
provinces in the part and 81 million from eastern and western parts. In the western part,
only Ningxia and Xingjiang will host about 10 million migrants, the majority of the
migrants will leave the part.
Under scenario 2, in the eastern part, Hebei, Jiangsu, and Guangdong, will absorb 117
million migrants, while the other seven provinces will export 139 million migrants.
Overall, the eastern part will export 22 million migrants. In the middle part, Shanxi,
Anhui, and Henan will attract 104 million migrants, among which 64 million come from
the other provinces in the part and 40 million from eastern and western parts. In the
western part, Guizhou, Yunnan and Gansu will host 50 million migrants, while the other
provinces will export 65 million migrants, 15 million of which will leave the part.
Because Neimeng, Hainan and Tibet do not participate in the competitive market, their
populations will remain constant in this research.19
5. Conclusion
Perfect competition would restructure the Chinese economy severely. If factor inputs
were rewarded according to their provincial or national scarcities, unskilled labor would
stand to lose and, therefore, inequality would mount. The pressure on interprovincial
migration would be enormous with 10 to 20% of the people on the road. The flipside is
the great potential for improvement of the average standard of living. Optimal
specialization between provinces alone (without changing technology or the trade
position), may add one half to the level of domestic final consumption in China.
Appendix 1.The general equilibrium model
The objective function is scalar D, the overall value of national final uses, the sum of
the values of final uses in all sectors and all provinces:
Max D
Denote the exogenous variables to the linear program as follows:
i A a square matrix of intermediate input coefficients, 30 by 30, of province i
i f a 30-dimensional column vector of the proportions of province i's final uses
i e a 30-dimensional column vector of province i's net foreign exports
i d           a scalar of province i's overall final uses in domestic final uses
The endogenous variables are:
i x    a column vector of province i's 30 outputs (nonnegative)
D   a scalar of overall domestic final uses




ii i i i
ii i
IA x f d D e
== =
−≥ + ∑∑ ∑
Notice that the material balances are pooled across provinces, meaning that the
commodities are assumed to be tradable. There is one exception. The last commodity,
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The labor constraints have been described in section 3.  In addition, there are 30 capital










i K  is a diagonal matrix of input coefficients of fixed capital in province i, 30 by
30, and m a 30-dimensional column vector of endowments of fixed capital.
For each vector of provincial shares of domestic final demand, d, the linear program
determines an optimal allocation of gross outputs and shadow prices. Denoting p as the
shadow prices of commodities,  ()
i Sd  as the overall value of net exports to the rest of
China in province i, and 
i
o S  as the observed value of net exports to the rest of China in
province i, the overall value of the net exports in each province is:
() () , 1, , 27.
ii i i i i Sd p IAx f d De i  =−−− = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
The equilibrium provincial shares will be determined by the condition that the
provincial values of net exports to the rest of China match the observed trade surplus:
() , 1, , 27.
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The solution to this non-linear equation, 
* d , is obtained by interactively solving the
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Appendix 2.The data for the general equilibrium model
National and provincial input-output tables
Most Chinese provinces have produced square input-output tables in three versions,
with 6, 33, and 118 commodities. We consolidate the 33 sectors table into one with 30
sectors by aggregating maintenance, repair and other industries, commerce and
restaurants, and freight and passenger transports. The tables provide intermediate inputs,
value added, domestic final use, some interprovincial and international trade, and gross
outputs.  The main problem is that to pinpoint the provincial final consumption vectors,
we must determine their exports to not only the rest of the world, but also to the rest of
China.
Twelve provinces provide separate information on interprovincial and international
trade. Their exports to the rest of China sum to 829,782 million Yuan, their imports to
898,960 million Yuan, hence their domestic net exports amount to -69,178 million
Yuan. Net domestic exports in the 15 provinces without separate information on
interprovincial and international trade must therefore be 69,178 million Yuan. We
assume that the ratio of overall exports (829,782 million Yuan) to gross output
(3,766,102 million Yuan) in the 12 provinces, which is 0.22, equals the ratio of overall
import (58,596 million Yuan) to gross output (2,663,441 million Yuan) in the 15
provinces. Then overall import from the rest of China in the 15 provinces is 585,957
million Yuan (and the overall export is 585,957 + 69,178 = 655,135 million Yuan). The22
overall export is allocated to the 30 sectors by their shares of net exports. The material
balances then determine the imports from the rest of China.
The trade data need to be further separated in the 15 provinces. We calculate their
shares in exports to the rest of China or the world and assume that these match the
shares of exports to the rest of China. This procedure disaggregates exports to the rest of
China by origin. The same procedure is applied to the imports from the rest of China.
Domestic trade in the 15 provinces is disaggregated by sector by means of the RAS
method.
9 For 15 provinces the exports are not separated between domestic and foreign.
The Newton algorithm (see Appendix 1) requires separation though. For this purpose
we have constructed a commodity by province table. Column 28, which is the sum of
columns 1-27, shows the overall exports at the sectoral level, whereas row 31, which is
the sum of rows 1-30, indicates the overall exports at the provincial level. Columns 1-28
and rows 1-31 are the original data, while column 29 and row 32 are the data estimated
above. The former are the overall exports to the rest of China at the sectoral level; the
latter are the overall exports to the rest of China at the provincial level. The data in
columns 1-27 and rows 1-30 need to be adjusted such that the sum of columns 1-27
equals column 29, and the sum of rows 1-30 equals row 32 by the RAS method. The
same procedure is also applied to the import from the rest of China. Once the exports to
and the imports from the rest of China are separated, the exports to and the imports from
the rest of the world can be obtained by extracting the exports to and the imports from
the rest of China from the total mixture of exports and imports.
Capital stocks
The State Statistical Bureau has made available to us the unpublished data on capital
stocks in the year 1992 for 40 industrial sectors by province. We aggregate these data23
into 23 industrial sectors according to the sector classifications in the input-output table.
The data for non-industrial sectors are estimated from the information on investment in
the China Statistical Yearbook (1993).
10 Here the classification is as follows: (1)
agriculture, (2) industry, (3) geological prospecting, (4) construction, (5) transportation
and telecommunications, (6) commerce, food services and storage, (7) real estate and
public services, (8) health care, sports and social welfare, (9) education and culture, (10)
scientific research, (11) banking and insurance, (12) administration, (13) others. Sectors
(3)-(13) are simply aggregated into seven non-industrial sectors. We calculate the
proportions of the investment in industry to the investment in these non-industrial
sectors and use these for the proportions of capital stocks. This determines the capital
stocks in the non-industrial sectors. The data on the capital stocks in the agricultural
sectors are obtained in a different way. The Rural Statistical Yearbook of China in
1993
11 provides data on the number of rural households by province and on the capital
stocks per rural household; the two sources are used to derive the capital stocks in the
agricultural sector by province.
Employment and labor resources
Information on employment and labor resources is obtained from the provincial
"Population Census in 1990." The original data in each province for employment and
labor are broken down into 55 sectors and eight types of occupation; we aggregate them
into 30 sectors and four types of occupations.
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1 We miss Neimeng, Hainan, and Tibet because of data problems. Fortunately, these are small
provinces.
2 The map is from http://www.chinatour.com/map/a.htm.
3 The province rows show the competitive wages (in Yuans) when labor mobility is limited to
the unskilled. The last two entries, on the extreme right hand side show the competitive rental
rates (in percentages) in the same scenario, as well as in the full mobility scenario, respectively.
In the full mobility scenario all wages are uniform across China, as depicted in the China row.
4 The objective function, domestic final use, has an observed value, and two optimal values,
corresponding to the two scenarios; the Theil's indices summarizing their distributions are
described in the sequel paper.
5 See Table 1 for province codes.
6 See Table 1 for province codes. The first four columns are outflows from employment.  The
sum is given in the fifth column.  If negative, there must be immigration, as the last column
confirms.  If positive, the figure is divided between emigrants (positive entries in the last
column) and unemployed (next to last column). Strictly speaking the model cannot predict the
distribution of the unemployed by province; we simply assume a uniform division of excess
workers between emigrants and unemployed.
7 See note 6. In this scenario all employment reductions are absorbed by emigration.
8 The family members are accounted for based on the dependency ratios in each province, which
are presented in appendix 2.
9 For a detailed introduction to the RAS method, see Bacharach (1970).
10 See Tables 5-23 "Investment in Capital Construction by Sector of National Economy and
Province in 1992" and 5-43 "Investment in Technical Updating and Transformation by Sector of
National Economy and Province in 1992."
11 See Table 4-3 "Rural Households and Population by Province in 1992" for the data on the
number of rural households by province, and Table 3-24 "Original Value of Fixed Assets for
Production Per Rural Household by Province" for the information on capital stocks per rural
household.